Draft decision

Aurizon Network's Amended 2014 draft access undertaking

August 2016
SUBMISSIONS

Closing date for submissions: 23 September 2016

Public involvement is an important element of the decision-making processes of the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA). Therefore, submissions are invited from interested parties concerning its assessment of Aurizon Network’s Amended 2014 draft access undertaking. The QCA will take account of all submissions received within the stated deadline.

Submissions, comments or inquiries regarding this paper should be directed to:

Queensland Competition Authority
GPO Box 2257
Brisbane Q. 4001
Tel (07) 3222 0555
Fax (07) 3222 0599
www.qca.org.au/submissions

Confidentiality

In the interests of transparency and to promote informed discussion, the QCA would prefer submissions to be made publicly available wherever this is reasonable. However, if a person making a submission does not want that submission to be public, that person should claim confidentiality in respect of the document (or any part of the document). Claims for confidentiality should be clearly noted on the front page of the submission and the relevant sections of the submission should be marked as confidential, so that the remainder of the document can be made publicly available. It would also be appreciated if two copies of each version of these submissions (i.e. the complete version and another excising confidential information) could be provided. Where it is unclear why a submission has been marked 'confidential', the status of the submission will be discussed with the person making the submission.

While the QCA will endeavour to identify and protect material claimed as confidential as well as exempt information and information disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest (within the meaning of the Right to Information Act 2009 (RTI)), it cannot guarantee that submissions will not be made publicly available.

Public access to submissions

Subject to any confidentiality constraints, submissions will be available for public inspection at the Brisbane office, or on the website at www.qca.org.au. If you experience any difficulty gaining access to documents please contact us on (07) 3222 0555.
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SUBMISSIONS
OVERVIEW

Aurizon Network's Amended 2014 DAU

On 7 July 2016, Aurizon Network submitted an amended 2014 draft access undertaking ('Amended 2014 DAU) to the QCA under section 136 of the Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 (QCA Act). The Amended 2014 DAU was provided in response to the QCA’s final decision in relation to Aurizon Network's 2014 draft access undertaking (2014 DAU) that was published on 28 April 2016 (April 2016 Decision).

Aurizon Network said that it developed the Amended 2014 DAU with the intention of aligning with the policy positions outlined in the QCA's April 2016 Decision. Aurizon Network acknowledged that it has proposed changes within the Amended 2014 DAU to clarify drafting, address workability issues, or achieve alignment with the QCA's April 2016 Decision.

Stakeholder submissions in response to Aurizon Network's Amended 2014 DAU

The QCA sought stakeholder comments on Aurizon Network's Amended 2014 DAU and received five submissions by the due date of 29 July 2016. Submissions were received from the Queensland Resources Council (QRC), Asciano, Glencore, Aurizon Operations and BMA.

QCA’s assessment process

Section 136(4) of the QCA Act requires the QCA to consider the Amended 2014 DAU and either approve or refuse to approve it. In doing so, the QCA may approve a draft access undertaking only if it considers it appropriate to do so having regard to each of the factors set out in section 138(2) of the QCA Act. We identified the QCA’s approach to section 138(2) in the April 2016 Decision.

Draft decision on the Amended 2014 DAU

The QCA has made this draft decision to provide interested parties with our draft assessment of the Amended 2014 DAU, after giving due consideration to stakeholder submissions received and having regard to each of the section 138(2) factors.

The QCA has considered the Amended 2014 DAU afresh. However, given that the Amended 2014 DAU incorporates many of the principles, drafting and policy intent of our April 2016 Decision and that the QCA extensively and comprehensively canvassed these, or very similar, issues in reaching that decision, this decision focuses primarily on:

- whether the Amended 2014 DAU is consistent with the policy intent of our April 2016 Decision, particularly where Aurizon Network has proposed alternative drafting; and

- new issues identified in stakeholder submissions that have not been considered previously by the QCA.

The QCA invites interested parties to make a written submission to the QCA in respect of this decision on the Amended 2014 DAU. To date, interested parties have had multiple opportunities to make submissions on Aurizon Network's and the QCA’s proposed amendments to the 2014 DAU. The QCA has given extensive consideration to those submissions and has published detailed analysis and reasoning. While the QCA will consider all submissions received in accordance with our statutory obligations, the QCA is particularly interested in stakeholder views on the matters raised in this draft decision.

Submissions should be given to the QCA by 23 September 2016. The QCA does not envisage providing an extension to this timeframe.
1  QCA ASSESSMENT OF THE AMENDED 2014 DAU

1.1  Aurizon Network proposal

Aurizon Network said changes have been made to the 2014 DAU to:

address issues of drafting, clarity, workability and alignment with the text of the QCA's Final Decision. In making these changes, Aurizon Network has been careful to ensure that it has not departed from the policy position set out in the QCA's Final Decision.\(^1\)

Aurizon Network provided explanatory notes outlining the reasons for changes incorporated into the Amended 2014 DAU in comparison to the April 2016 Decision.\(^2\)

The Amended 2014 DAU also includes corrections to typographical or transpositional errors contained in the April 2016 Decision. Minor adjustments have also been made to the reference tariffs, as outlined in the explanatory notes provided by Aurizon Network.

1.2  Overview of stakeholder submissions on the Amended 2014 DAU

Stakeholder submissions that expressed support for approval of the Amended 2014 DAU essentially focused on particular aspects of the drafting, including:

- seeking clarification that a particular change made by Aurizon Network is consistent with the policy intent of the April 2016 Decision
- raising 'workability' issues with particular clauses
- indicating parts of the Amended 2014 DAU which should be re-examined as part of the next regulatory period assessment process.

We also note the QRC's submission indicates that agreement has been reached with Aurizon Network to make particular amendments to the DAU, which would be made through a draft amending access undertaking (DAAU) in the event the Amended 2014 DAU is approved.

In contrast, Glencore opposes the approval of the Amended 2014 DAU, specifically in respect of the treatment of certain pricing matters for the Wiggins Island Rail Project (WIRP) and the application of access conditions applying to WIRP Users that were approved by the QCA in 2012. That said, Glencore indicated it otherwise supports the QRC's submission (except to the extent that the QRC supported approval of the Amended 2014 DAU).

1.3  QCA analysis and draft decision

We have considered the Amended 2014 DAU afresh. Having considered stakeholder submissions and having regard to each of the section 138(2) factors affecting our consideration whether the approval of that draft access undertaking is appropriate, our draft decision is to approve the Amended 2014 DAU.

We acknowledge Aurizon Network's stated intention that the Amended 2014 DAU be consistent with the policy intent of our April 2016 Decision. To this end, the Amended 2014 DAU is a product of an extensive and comprehensive consultation process involving interested parties

\(^1\) Aurizon Network, sub. no. 1: 8.
\(^2\) Aurizon Network, sub. no. 1.
over a substantial period of time during which time the QCA's policy intent has been formed and articulated in various decisions, including:

- Draft Decision on Maximum Allowable Revenue (October 2014)
- the Initial Draft Decision (January 2015)
- the WIRP Draft Decision (July 2015)
- the Consolidated Draft Decision (December 2015)

We do not propose to re-state the QCA's policy intent in this decision. We instead refer interested parties to our April 2016 Decision for our policy intent and analysis of the 2014 DAU.

In our April 2016 Decision, we identified the way in which we considered it appropriate that the 2014 DAU should be amended with regard to that policy intent and our analysis. To the extent that Aurizon Network has adopted our proposed drafting, we consider that drafting remains appropriate and we refer to the analysis supporting our 2016 Decision.

Aurizon Network does not have a statutory obligation to submit the Amended 2014 DAU to contain all of the amendments that we identified in our April 2016 Decision. The Amended 2014 DAU submitted by Aurizon Network continues to be a draft access undertaking that has been submitted voluntarily by Aurizon Network. As such, Aurizon Network has chosen in places to adopt alternative drafting. To the extent that Aurizon Network has not adopted our proposed drafting, we have considered the implications of the different drafting in light of our policy intent and analysis as outlined in our April 2016 Decision, noting this policy intent and analysis expressed our considered views on the application of each of the section 138(2) factors.

Ultimately, we consider the Amended 2014 DAU is consistent with the way in which the QCA considered it appropriate for the 2014 DAU to be amended, as set out in our April 2016 Decision. While we note Aurizon Network has proposed some amendments to the DAU drafting relative to our April 2016 Decision, we consider these appropriately reflect the relevant policy intent and underlying analysis set out in our April 2016 Decision. Having regard to each of the factors set out in section 138(2), we consider that the Amended 2014 DAU is appropriate for us to approve.

We have considered the detailed issues raised in submissions on the Amended 2014 DAU. In particular:

- Glencore's submission in respect of access conditions and pricing matters for WIRP. Our draft decision is to not accept Glencore's proposal. Our analysis is set out in detail in section 2.
- specific clauses of the Amended 2014 DAU that were raised by QRC, Asciano, Aurizon Operations and BMA. Our draft decision on those issues and our analysis is set out in section 3.

Our detailed consideration is outlined in this draft decision.

**Draft decision**

(1) **After considering the Amended 2014 DAU, and having considered stakeholder submissions, our draft decision is to approve Aurizon Network's Amended 2014 DAU.**
2 PROPOSAL TO REVIEW WIRP ACCESS CONDITIONS AND WIRP PRICING

2.1 Background

Our 2016 April Decision set out in detail the background to WIRP, so we do not repeat that background again for the purposes of this decision. Glencore's submission, in effect, raises concerns regarding the manner in which WIRP access conditions that were approved by QCA under UT3 should be considered by the QCA in the context of the QCA's decision whether to approve UT4, as further explained below.

The table below outlines the processes leading up to the QCA's 2012 approval of the WIRP access conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date / Clause</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 April 2010</td>
<td>Aurizon Network (formerly known as QR Network) submitted a voluntary draft access undertaking (the April 2010 DAU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 2010</td>
<td>The QCA released its final decision approving the 2010 DAU, thereby approving the operation of the 2010 Undertaking.(^3) Relevantly, the approved 2010 Undertaking provided for QCA approval for proposed access conditions intended to apply to provision of access which requires a significant investment to expand rail infrastructure.(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 2010</td>
<td>Aurizon Network was in discussions with stage 1 users regarding the Wiggins Island Rail Project (WIRP Users).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2011 and 2012</td>
<td>During this period WIRP Users negotiated with Aurizon Network. The conditions that Aurizon Network negotiated in order to proceed with the funding and construction of WIRP were agreed with all parties and submitted to the QCA pursuant to the 2010 Undertaking framework. QCA then considered proposed access conditions for the WIRP Users within the 2010 Undertaking framework; this included the submission of proposed access conditions (including an access conditions report), consultation and submissions from interested parties, and ultimately a QCA assessment process.(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 2011</td>
<td>Aurizon Network formally submitted the access conditions for the QCA’s approval. The detailed terms of the agreed access conditions were contained in individual agreements (WIRP deeds) as between Aurizon Network and each of the WIRP users. The primary access condition being a WIRP fee, a monthly payment made to Aurizon Network in addition to revenue from access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 2012</td>
<td>The QCA approved Aurizon Networks’ proposed access conditions for WIRP users (WIRP access conditions).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) QCA, 2010.

\(^4\) Refer to the 2010 Undertaking, clause 6.5 “Structure of Access Charges and Access Conditions” for detail as the processes, information requirements and approval processes.

\(^5\) Further details as to the QCA’s Decision 2012 approval of the access conditions for the Wiggins Island Rail Project (QCA’s 2012 Decision) are at http://www.qca.org.au/getattachment/b32f2297-32fc-4433-84c8-9ed954d23031/QCA-Final-Decision-Access-Conditions.aspx
2.2 Glencore's submission

Glencore supported the QRC submission, except to the extent that the QRC supported approval of the Amended 2014 DAU. Glencore's submission relates to the Wiggins Island Rail Project (WIRP), specifically relating to access conditions applying to WIRP Users that were approved by the QCA in 2012 and the proposed WIRP pricing arrangements.

Glencore did not dispute the appropriateness of the QCA's 2012 Decision to approve the access conditions.

Glencore submitted that the QCA's 2012 Decision to approve the WIRP access conditions is not legally binding on the QCA in respect of the treatment of reference tariffs in the UT4 period.

Glencore further submitted that while the WIRP Deed was a concluded contract, this does not mean the WIRP Deed is independent of the QCA's approval of the 'new' access arrangements proposed by Aurizon.

Glencore's submission essentially focuses on a number of key threshold contentions, namely that:

(a) the QCA should subject the WIRP access conditions to a new review as part of UT4, as no approval of the imposition of such access conditions has been given for the UT4 regulatory period

(b) the QCA's 2012 Decision to approve the WIRP access conditions was made under the provisions of the 2010 Undertaking with limited merits review based on the circumstances prevailing at the time

(c) circumstances are now different compared to when the WIRP access conditions were approved by the QCA in 2012 under UT3.

(d) the QCA's 2012 Decision to approve the WIRP access conditions is not binding on the QCA in terms of the UT4 regulatory period

(e) the WIRP Deed is itself an access agreement for the purposes of the UT4 undertaking and the WIRP fee is an access charge, as such any revenue should be used to lower reference tariffs (Glencore proposes that WIRP reference tariffs should be lowered for WIRP users).

(f) by reference to the section 138(2) factors of the QCA Act it would not be appropriate to approve the Amended 2014 DAU without the adjustments to the reference tariffs applicable to WIRP users as proposed by Glencore.

(g) the WIRP Deed terms should be taken into account in the QCA's assessment of the Amended 2014 DAU, with the revenue from the WIRP fees being included in the application of the System Allowable Revenue and reference tariffs adjusted for WIRP Users.

On this basis, Glencore said that the QCA should consider whether the total return which Aurizon Network is able to receive, including the WIRP fee, is appropriate pursuant to section 138(2). In Glencore's view, the return is not appropriate and the QCA should therefore refuse to approve Aurizon's Amended 2014 DAU (unless it is amended in the manner proposed by Glencore). Glencore's key contentions are discussed below.

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6 UT3 refers to the approved 2010 Access Undertaking.
(a) Appropriateness of reviewing QCA approved access conditions

Glencore submitted that it did not accept that setting reference tariffs taking into account the appropriateness of the WIRP Deed access conditions as part of the UT4 regulatory period would have any retrospective effect, any more than the review of the appropriate regulatory WACC would have a retrospective effect. Glencore did not see any strong justification to treat the provisions of the WIRP Deed in a different manner to any other part of the regulated business.

Glencore did not accept that the WIRP Deed should not ever be again subject to regulatory review, as it said the WIRP Deed is not independent of regulatory access arrangements. Glencore said that no application was made by Aurizon Network in respect of the approval of the WIRP Deed as access conditions for the UT4 regulatory period, and nothing in the Amended 2014 DAU appears to exclude requirement for such approval.

Glencore then cited the fundamental requirements for the access conditions report as set out in clause 6.13.1 of the Amended 2014 DAU - which are that access conditions may be imposed 'to the extent reasonably required in order to mitigate Aurizon Network's or the Access Seeker's exposure to any additional costs or risks associated with providing Access for the Access Seeker's proposed Train Service and which are not, or would not, be included in the calculation of the Reference Tariff based on the Approved WACC'.

Glencore said the QCA is not obliged to consider any access conditions or any proposed agreement between an access seeker and Aurizon Network without enquiry as to whether it satisfies this fundamental requirement.

(b) 2012 WIRP access conditions were approved with limited merits review

Glencore acknowledged the decision of the QCA to approve the WIRP Deed access conditions for the purpose of the 2010 Undertaking. Glencore said that it did not dispute the appropriateness of the decision as the QCA was faced with the choice of either approving the access conditions or accepting that Aurizon Network would not proceed with the funding and construction of WIRP.

Glencore's concern was that under the 2010 Undertaking, Aurizon Network was not obliged to fund the WIRP infrastructure and no user funding option was available. Glencore submitted that Aurizon Network as a monopoly provider was in a position to extract an above-regulated rate of return as a pre-condition of its agreement to construct WIRP infrastructure.

Glencore considered that since the funding and construction of WIRP was at the discretion of Aurizon Network, if WIRP Users had not agreed to the requirements of the WIRP Deed, WIRP infrastructure would not have proceeded in a timeframe required by WIRP Users at the time. Glencore said that on the basis of this endorsement, the QCA approved the terms of the WIRP Deed with only a limited merits review.

Glencore added that it did not believe that the QCA's approval of the WIRP Deed access conditions was intended to have the effect of excluding future re-examination of the matter. Glencore did not see any strong economic justification to treat the reconsideration of the provisions of the WIRP Deed in a different manner from any other part of the regulated business.

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7 Glencore, sub. no. 5: 5.
8 Glencore, sub. no. 5: 2.
9 The WIRP access conditions included a WIRP fee that is a payment in addition to regulated access charges to compensate Aurizon Network for various additional costs and risks.
Glencore submitted that while the QCA cannot repudiate its approval of the WIRP Deed, it needs to ensure that the balance of costs and risks is appropriate and make adjustments in future undertakings to prevent over-compensation to the access provider.\(^\text{10}\)

(c) Binding decision

Glencore submitted legal advice that the QCA is not bound in its assessment of UT4, by the outcome of any decision it made under UT3 in respect of the WIRP Deed access conditions.\(^\text{11}\)

(d) Changed circumstances

Glencore cites that circumstances are now different (when compared to the time of signing under UT3).\(^\text{12}\) While not being specific about the different circumstances, Glencore indicated that a user funding arrangement is now to be available under UT4 that would give more countervailing power to users in negotiating access conditions. Glencore also noted that the QCA had in UT4 rejected the approach that the legitimate business interests of the access provider have primacy in balancing the section 138(2) factors.\(^\text{13}\)

(e) Access conditions are access agreements

Glencore said that the WIRP Deed is itself an Access Agreement for the purposes of the UT4 regulatory period, and that it is hard to find any real difference between the incidence of the WIRP fee and the incidence of a charge for access rights.

Glencore then submitted: "...because the WIRP Fees have been found to be providing Aurizon Network with a return in excess of what is permitted by the regulatory regime, Glencore submits that these sums should be included as “Access Charges” when determining whether Aurizon has earned in excess of the System Allowable Revenue in the relevant systems."\(^\text{14}\)

(f) Section 138 of the QCA Act

Glencore advised that section 138 of the QCA Act requires the QCA to only approve a new draft access undertaking, such as the Amended 2014 DAU, if it considers it appropriate to do so on its own merits.

In relation to the section 138(2) factors, Glencore submitted that:

- Section 138(2)(a)—object of Part 5—Glencore submitted that the WIRP Deed access conditions provide monopoly profits reflecting Aurizon Network’s market power at the time of negotiations and results in inefficient access pricing which cannot be consistent with the object of Part 5.

- Section 138(2)(b)—legitimate business interests of the owner or operator—Glencore said that Aurizon Network does not have a legitimate interest in earning monopoly profits that are not commensurate with the regulatory and commercial risks involved.

- Section 138(2)(d)—the public interest—Glencore said that the WIRP fee reflects additional and inefficient costs which adversely impacts on rail operators and coal producers.

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\(^{10}\) Glencore, sub no 6: 1-2

\(^{11}\) Glencore, sub. no. 5: 2-3.

\(^{12}\) Glencore, sub. no. 5: 3.

\(^{13}\) Glencore, sub. no. 6: 9-11.

\(^{14}\) Glencore, sub no 5. 8
• Section 138(2)(g)—the pricing principles in section 168A—Glencore submitted that the WIRP fee is a return that is additional to the revenue that the QCA determined was appropriate in respect of efficient costs and risks.

• Section 138(2)(h)—any other issues considered relevant—Glencore noted that the extent to which a regulated entity earns windfall gains and monopoly profits is relevant. Glencore also said that a relevant issue for the purposes of 138(2)(h) is the treatment of access conditions under UT4 principles.15

(g) Pricing implications

Glencore proposed that the QCA should not be bound by its previous decisions in respect of WIRP access conditions, and on the basis that risks are equalised across WIRP and non-WIRP users alike, we should reduce Aurizon Network’s approved regulated revenue by the quantum of the WIRP fee. Glencore said this could be achieved by setting a discounted regulated access charge for WIRP users equivalent to the WIRP revenue. That is, while the WIRP fee revenue should be included in System Allowable Revenue, the amounts should be deducted from the reference tariff applicable to WIRP Users.16

2.3 QCA draft response

Having regard to Glencore’s submission and taking into account the factors in section 138(2), the QCA’s draft decision is that:

• it is not appropriate to refuse to approve Aurizon’s Amended 2014 DAU for the reason that the WIRP fee was not deducted from the reference tariff applicable to WIRP Users (as proposed by Glencore)

• it is appropriate to approve the Amended 2014 DAU proposed by Aurizon Network, including specifically the proposed UT3 transitional provisions.

A brief summary of our application of the factors in section 138(2) is set out below, as supplemented by our specific consideration of the matters outlined in Glencore’s submission which is expanded further in the following sections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory factor in section 138(2)</th>
<th>QCA comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the object of this part - namely to promote the economically efficient operation of, use of and investment in, significant infrastructure by which services are provided, with the effect of promoting effective competition in upstream and downstream markets</td>
<td>We consider that if we undermined the effect of the approval of the access conditions in UT4, as effectively proposed by Glencore, this would undermine regulatory certainty. In turn, this would increase investment risk and would not promote future economically efficient investment in significant infrastructure by Aurizon Network. Under-investment by Aurizon Network would not be conducive to promoting effective competition in upstream and downstream markets. At the same time, we need to balance this consideration against the need for economically efficient operation of, and use of, such infrastructure. Further detail on this point is set out below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the legitimate business interests of the owner or operator of the service</td>
<td>We note that the access conditions were intended to facilitate rapid completion of WIRP and to compensate Aurizon for additional risk. These factors were considered in our original decision in 2012 and reflect legitimate business interests of Aurizon Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if the owner and operator of the service are different entities—the legitimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Glencore, sub. no. 5: 5.
16 Glencore, sub. no. 5: 12.
Queensland Competition Authority
Proposal to review WIRP access conditions and WIRP pricing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business interests of the operator of the service are protected</th>
<th>We also consider that Aurizon has a legitimate business interest arising from the long-term investment certainty intended to be provided by QCA’s decision in 2012, hence it would not be in Aurizon’s legitimate business interests for QCA to make a decision in relation to UT4 that undermined the intent of decisions made by the QCA in the context of UT3 that were intended to provide longer-term certainty.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The public interest, including the public interest in having competition in markets (whether or not in Australia);</td>
<td>We canvassed the public interest at length in our original decision to approve the access conditions. We do not disagree with our previous reasoning. We also consider that absent evidence that the previous process was deficient in a material regard, the public interest in ensuring regulatory continuity and certainty outweighs the need to take into account any changes in circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interests of persons who may seek access to the service, including whether adequate provision has been made for compensation if the rights of users of the service are adversely affected;</td>
<td>We recognise the various concerns expressed by Glencore regarding the adverse impact of the WIRP Deed. However, we note that one of the interests of WIRP users at the time these arrangements were negotiated was to facilitate the timely completion of WIRP. Absent the access conditions, it is unclear whether this would have occurred. We are particularly concerned by any suggestion that access seekers can enter into a binding commercial agreement at ‘Time X’ to enable construction of a facility and receive from the QCA a decision regarding the appropriate regulatory treatment of that commercial arrangement, then revisit the appropriate regulatory treatment of that arrangement with QCA at later ‘Time Y’ when the infrastructure has already been completed. QCA is concerned regarding the scope for future opportunistic use of regulatory processes by access seekers when adequate provision has already been made historically to balance the interests of access seekers with those of access providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of excluding existing assets for pricing purposes</td>
<td>QCA notes Glencore’s concerns that the pricing contemplated by the WIRP arrangements could lead to over-recovery by Aurizon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The pricing principles mentioned in section 168A</td>
<td>We note that the WIRP users did make submissions on the pricing at the time and these submissions were considered by QCA. Moreover, the pricing was justified by Aurizon Network at the time on the basis of various matters such as the need for timely completion of the WIRP infrastructure and the additional risks to Aurizon. These matters were also canvassed in detail at the time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other issues the authority considers relevant</td>
<td>Another issue we consider relevant is the need for long-term regulatory consistency and certainty in regulatory decisions made by QCA in relation to successive undertakings made by Aurizon Network. One of the purposes of an access undertaking is to provide greater certainty for all stakeholders regarding the terms and conditions on which access is provided.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Certainty

We consider that, among other things, Glencore’s proposal would have a deleterious impact on future regulatory certainty as it would have the practical effect of overturning the intent and
purpose of commercially negotiated access conditions that were subject to a QCA approval process.

While the regulatory framework is based on the expectation that an access undertaking will be subject to periodic assessment and potential revisions to apply within subsequent regulatory periods, the QCA notes that these expectations are, to the extent possible, articulated within the QCA's decisions. The access conditions were developed partly in recognition of the need to provide greater certainty to stakeholders regarding the regulatory treatment of commercial arrangements that extended beyond the term of a particular access undertaking that was in place at the time.

Indeed, we are not aware of any suggestion that the regulatory treatment of the WIRP access conditions by the QCA was to be subject to any future re-examination by the QCA as part of consideration of subsequent draft access undertakings.

To the extent that Glencore seeks that the WIRP fee be taken into account by QCA in respect of the treatment of reference tariffs in the UT4 period, the QCA considers that the practical effect is the same as if it were to re-assess the WIRP access conditions that had been negotiated and agreed by the relevant parties and reach a new and different conclusion. In practical effect, Glencore is requesting that QCA adopt a different regulatory treatment of the WIRP access conditions under UT4 than QCA had previously determined was appropriate under UT3.

The QCA's draft view is that Glencore is seeking to use the current regulatory process to, in effect, revisit the appropriate regulatory treatment of a previously executed commercial agreement that it entered into in 2012, thereby in part negating the intended commercial effect of that agreement. The impacts of this are a relevant consideration in the context of s. 138(2) of the QCA Act.

The QCA is concerned with future considerations, including promoting future efficient use and investment in the network and dependent markets. In the absence of evidence that the WIRP access conditions were to be subject to future reassessment, and that any such reassessment would promote the objects of the QCA Act, the QCA does not accept Glencore's proposal.

In this respect, stakeholders are invited to provide evidence on whether or not Aurizon Network and access holders executed WIRP Deeds with the expectation that the access conditions would be subject to future reassessment as part of assessments of subsequent draft access undertakings. Stakeholders are also invited to provide any evidence to the effect that the regulatory treatment of the WIRP access conditions by QCA, as approved by QCA under UT3, was not intended to survive the expiry of UT3 or have any long-term effect beyond UT3.

Subject to receipt and consideration of any such stakeholder evidence, the QCA's draft position is that Glencore's proposal would not be consistent with the object of Part 5 or the public interest (s 138(2)(a) and (d)), or be in the legitimate business interests of the access provider (s 138(2)(b)), given the regulatory uncertainty it would create. Similarly, the same reasoning applies in respect of access holders that execute agreements with access conditions and access seekers (s. 138(2) (e) and (h)), that is neither party would anticipate that a future regulatory decision would have the practical effect of unwinding a negotiated commercial outcome.

17 For example, aspects of the weighted average cost of capital are assessed by the QCA with the expectation that it is subject to periodic assessment for a discrete regulatory period.
The QCA is of the view that the above considerations in the context of s. 138(2) outweigh the various arguments outlined by Glencore, including the specific application of the pricing principles to determine the reference tariffs as identified by Glencore.

(a) The 2012 WIRP access conditions were approved with limited merits review

In our 2012 Decision, we assessed the WIRP access conditions against criteria set out in 2010 Undertaking in light of all access seekers (that is, all WIRP Users) agreeing to the access conditions sought by Aurizon Network,\(^{18}\) such that the QCA must approve the proposed access conditions \(^{\textit{unless}}\) we were satisfied:

- it would be contrary to the public interest, including the public interest in having competition in markets
- it is reasonably expected to disadvantage future access seekers, existing access holders, customers and other stakeholders not parties to the access agreements containing access conditions
- Aurizon Network failed to provide the required access conditions report
- it would contravene a provision of the 2010 Undertaking or QCA Act.\(^ {19}\)

Our 2012 Decision assessed the application against the relevant criteria where the WIRP Users agreed to the proposed access conditions, concluding that:

- the access conditions were not contrary to the public interest, including the public interest in competition in markets—with relevant factors including transparency of access conditions, whether they reflected an exercise of monopoly power by Aurizon Network enabling them to extract monopoly rents, and whether stakeholders had an alternative to agreeing to the access conditions
- stakeholders would not be disadvantaged by the access conditions—with relevant factors including whether the WIRP fee or aspects of the WIRP enhancement are recovered from non-WIRP Users and whether the WIRP fee may have an impact on Aurizon Network’s incentives to schedule or reschedule trains in a particular way to advantage the WIRP Users
- Aurizon Network’s agreed access conditions were submitted for approval in accordance with cl. 6.5.4(e) of the 2010 Undertaking, and as such, does not contravene a provision of the undertaking.
- It was also not evident to the QCA that the agreed access conditions contravened any other provision of the undertaking or the QCA Act.

In light of the above, the QCA’s 2012 Decision was that there was a clear public interest in the project proceeding and that the WIRP access conditions would not reasonably be expected to disadvantage stakeholders.\(^ {20}\) We note that the public interest is also relevant factor that we must consider when making our current decision under section 138(2) of the QCA Act.

As outlined in our 2012 Decision approving the WIRP access conditions, we considered stakeholder views that Aurizon Network had used its monopoly position to negotiate access conditions that over-compensated it for the risks it faced. However, we noted that:

\(^{18}\) Clause 6.5.4(e) of the 2010 Undertaking.
\(^{19}\) QCA, 2012: 8.
\(^{20}\) QCA, 2012: 11.
the approval criteria do not provide for the Authority to consider the reasonableness of the access conditions directly as they have been submitted with the support of all of the stage 1 users (cl. 6.5.4(e)). In contrast, if only some or none of the stage 1 users had supported the access conditions, the Authority would have been required to look at a range of factors, including whether the access conditions are required to mitigate QR Network’s exposure to the financial risks and whether these risks are not currently covered by existing arrangements (cl. 6.5.4(f)). The Authority’s assessment of these risks would have necessitated the Authority explicitly considering the reasonableness of the access conditions.21

Accordingly, the QCA conducted the assessment required under the 2010 Undertaking, an assessment which took into account the fact that at the time none of the WIRP Users opposed the proposed access conditions. We note that Glencore accepts that the 2012 Decision made by the QCA was appropriate taking account of the circumstances of the time.

The QCA’s historic decision, including the QCA’s analysis at the time and the context to that decision, has been considered by QCA under section 138(2)(h) of the QCA Act as another issue that the QCA considers to be relevant.

(b) Appropriateness of reviewing QCA approved access conditions

If it is accepted, as Glencore proposes, that the QCA should refuse to approve the Amended 2014 DAU on the basis of a fundamentally amended view as to the appropriate regulatory treatment of the WIRP access conditions (being conditions that were agreed upon by the relevant parties, assessed and approved by the QCA under UT3 and signed into a 20-year agreement), the issue arises as to whether QCA should propose amendments to the Amended 2014 DAU to make changes to WIRP reference tariffs to offset the effect of the WIRP Deed terms.

In this respect, the changes to the Amended 2014 DAU proposed by Glencore have the practical effect of overturning a commercially negotiated agreement. More precisely, that QCA would be required to adopt a different regulatory treatment of the WIRP Deed in UT4 than QCA had historically determined was appropriate in the context of UT3. Generally, this harms:

- certainty and predictability—a person making a decision based on justified expectations in regard to a regulatory decision may be disadvantaged if the regulatory decision is subsequently changed.

- efficiency—if a regulator revisits past regulatory decisions this will lead to increased regulatory complexity and cost. As a result, regulation can become less efficient.

We have further elaborated on these issues in our summary of the application of the section 138(2) factors set out above, as well as our further analysis below.

In our view, the importance of regulatory certainty in the context of the application of the various factors in section 138(2) outweighs the various competing interests identified by Glencore in the context of the application of those various factors.

In respect of Glencore’s arguments, we consider that:

- Access conditions for WIRP were negotiated and intended to apply for 20 years, and therefore clearly were intended to apply across successive regulatory periods, that is, there was no provision in the WIRP Deed to subject access conditions to future review in line with access undertakings. We do not agree that the WIRP Deed is part of access regulatory arrangements to be considered as part of our consideration of the Amended 2014 DAU.

It is not appropriate by reference to the s138(2) factors to make adjustments to the undertaking that would have the effect of offsetting previously accepted contractual arrangements and access conditions. We acknowledge this will lead to different contracts and agreements signed at different times and reflecting different regulatory arrangements, as occurs already with access agreements. However, such matters are provided for by the transitional arrangements set out in clause 12.4, of which clause 12.4(a) deems a range of activities done under the 2010 Undertaking to continue under the new undertaking. This implies an expectation that access conditions would transition to the new undertaking.

The QCA recognises the importance of maintaining regulatory certainty in the context of the application of the various statutory factors. We consider the proposal by Glencore will result in disincentives to invest in access infrastructure, not only by Aurizon Network but also other regulated access providers. This is contrary to the object of Part 5 (section 138(2)(a)), that is, to promote the economically efficient investment in significant infrastructure. It is also not in the legitimate business interests of the access provider (s 138(2)(b) and, by creating disincentives to invest, the interests of access seekers (s 138(2)(e)). This provides in our view a very strong economic justification to reject Glencore’s proposal in respect of how the WIRP access conditions should be addressed as part of the UT4 regulatory process, or to make corresponding adjustments to the MAR or reference tariffs.

Making a decision that has the practical effect of bypassing negotiated and previously approved access conditions may benefit WIRP access holders in this instance, but could be a disadvantage for access holders and access seekers in other circumstances. For example, following such a precedent, Aurizon Network could request the QCA review other negotiated access conditions as part of a future draft access undertaking to allow it to practically bypass these to benefit itself at the expense of access holders. The approach proposed by Glencore creates uncertainty for all access holders and access seekers, and would not be consistent with section 138(2) (e) and (h) of the QCA Act.

The UT4 guidelines are drafted in terms of reviewing new access conditions, and the access conditions report should be provided at the start of the negotiation period (for new access conditions). This would not be the case for the WIRP access conditions which are already negotiated and in place. To do otherwise would essentially seek to re-open a previously executed commercial agreement.

Irrespective of whether, in a legal sense, we may not be prevented from taking into account’s Glencore’s proposal, it is a matter that requires the QCA to exercise its judgement in considering the factors set out in section 138(2). We consider that the efficacy of the access conditions arrangements should be maintained, as set out in Part 6 of the undertaking.

(c) The importance of previous regulatory decisions

We note the views expressed by Glencore that the previous decision is not binding on the QCA. Irrespective of this, the existence of a previous decision on the matter is a material and relevant consideration that the QCA takes into account under s. 138(2)(h).

(d) Changed circumstances

At the time, the access conditions were to address such risks as negotiated by the parties. Indeed, the WIRP access conditions were based on compensating for the additional costs and risks prevailing at the time of signing, and required payment of the WIRP fee over the agreed 20 years to provide this compensation. We note that in our Final Decision to approve the 2010 Undertaking, we indicated that the role of access conditions was to enable Aurizon Network to
supplement the standard terms and conditions of access with additional requirements to address particular costs and risks, associated with a particular investment. A subsequent change in circumstances or a change in the balance of costs and risks does not in our view advance Glencore's submission. As far as the QCA is aware there was no expectation that if circumstances changed, the access conditions could be revisited.

(e) Access conditions are access agreements

We consider that access conditions are a specific mechanism to mitigate Aurizon Network's additional costs or risks associated with providing access in particular circumstances.

Glencore's comments in relation to whether access conditions are similar to an access agreement, or whether the WIRP fee is an access charge or not, is largely irrelevant. The key issue is not the form, but the purpose of access conditions.

The purpose of the WIRP access conditions was to include an additional payment to the reference tariff to provide compensation for costs and risks that were considered not to be covered by the reference tariff. This was assessed based on the best available information at the time by all parties and agreed to by the WIRP Users and Aurizon Network at the time.

In the absence of evidence that the QCA was misled as to purpose behind the access conditions or that the position was somehow to the contrary, we consider that there was and is no expectation that WIRP access conditions would updated as part of a future undertaking.

(f) Section 138 of the QCA Act

We have identified above our consideration of the manner in which each of the factors set out in section 138(2) of the QCA Act should be applied and balanced.

However, in respect of the specific arguments raised by Glencore regarding the application of the section 138(2) factors, our response to Glencore is as follows:

- Section 138(2)(a)—object of Part 5—The above regulatory returns earned from WIRP reflected perceived additional costs and risks that were agreed upon by WIRP users in order to progress with the expansion for Aurizon Network to invest and manage the relevant additional risks. As we note above, unwinding agreed commercial arrangements would undermine future confidence in the regulatory process, increase future uncertainty for all parties, and create a disincentive for future investment. In our view, to accept Glencore's proposal would result in outcomes contrary to the Part 5 objective, that is, to promote the efficient operation, use and investment in infrastructure.

- Section 138(2)(b)—legitimate business interests of the owner or operator—It was the QCA's understanding that the parties agreed and signed on to the access conditions which were subsequently approved by the QCA. In such circumstances, it would clearly be against the legitimate business interests of Aurizon Network if the regulatory process could be used to practically circumvent commercially negotiated arrangements and adjust an access seeker's position relative to Aurizon Network.

- Section 138(2)(d)—the public interest—Again, we consider it would not be in the public interest to make a decision that caused stakeholders to lack confidence in the QCA regulatory framework and processes. As noted above, it was considered that the public interest in having the investment proceed in a timely manner was a key factor in the QCA's decision to approve the access conditions in 2012.
• Section 138(2)(g)—the pricing principles in section 168A—Again, we note that the WIRP fee was set to cover additional costs and risks incurred in the infrastructure development as agreed by WIRP users. This is consistent with allowing a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory and commercial risks involved.

• Section 138(2)(h)—any other issues considered relevant—the QCA in 2012 made a decision based on the information available at the time, and based on the fact the WIRP users agreed to the proposed WIRP conditions. The fact that the QCA made a well informed decision within the agreed framework at the time, a decision in respect of which Glencore states "we do not dispute the appropriateness of this decision for UT3," is a material and relevant consideration for the QCA under 138(2)(h).

(g) pricing implications

As the WIRP fee reflects a separate commercially negotiated charge for additional risk, our April 2016 Decision excluded this revenue from our proposed reference tariffs. The option of a discounted reference tariff could be incorporated into the undertaking potentially without affecting the unfair differentiation requirements of the QCA Act. However, given our conclusions that it would not be appropriate to refuse to approve Aurizon’s Amended 2014 DAU for the reason that the WIRP fee was not discounted for WIRP users, it was not necessary to reach a view on whether a discounted tariff would otherwise satisfy the requirements of the QCA Act.

We consider that the Amended 2014 DAU should not include adjustments for reference tariffs to offset the WIRP fee for WIRP Deed access holders.
3 OTHER STAKEHOLDERS' SUBMISSIONS

Other stakeholders also provided comment on Aurizon Network’s Amended 2014 DAU. The QCA has considered each matter raised by stakeholders in light of our obligations under section 138(2) of the QCA Act. In doing so, the QCA had regard to:

- the April 2016 Decision which considered many of the below issues in detail (s. 138(2)(h))
- whether stakeholders were amenable to the issues being addressed through future regulatory processes (s. 138(2)(h)).

The QCA has formed the view that the above considerations collectively, or in part, outweigh the need to make a draft decision to reject Aurizon Network’s Amended 2014 DAU on the basis of the specific matters raised below.

3.1 QRC submission

Although we understand that QRC was involved in consultation with Aurizon Network on the Amended 2014 DAU, QRC have raised specific concerns about five amendments made by Aurizon Network that differ from the drafting proposed in the QCA’s April 2016 Decision.

QRC said that its concerns for three of the amendments could be dealt with by means of a draft amending access undertaking (DAAU) from Aurizon Network after UT4 is approved. We understand that QRC is not submitting in respect of these amendments that the QCA should refuse to approve the Amended 2014 DAU.

In the case of two of the amendments, relating to Part 8 capacity shortfalls and the definition of consequential loss in the Standard Access Agreement, QRC sought clarification from the QCA on whether the amendments were consistent with our April 2016 Decision policy intent.

QCA response

Aurizon Network has confirmed its intention to submit a DAAU to implement the three amendments with the QRC, as per its agreement with QRC.

Table 2 QRC comments and QCA response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>QRC position</th>
<th>QCA response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.9.4 Capacity shortfalls</td>
<td>QRC submitted that the amendment to clause 8.9.4 limits Aurizon Network’s obligation to fund shortfall expansions arising for expansions commencing after the approval date. This means that capacity shortfalls arising from previous projects are not addressed under Part 8. However, QRC said it would accept the amendment if it was considered by the QCA to be consistent with its April 2016 Decision, although it indicated it will revisit this issue during the UT5 process.</td>
<td>The April 2016 Decision was not explicit on this issue as the issue has only arisen due to the lateness of UT4. In these circumstances, we consider that it would be unreasonable to apply this funding obligation prior to the approval date and create regulatory uncertainty. Accordingly, we do not accept QRC’s position.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

22 QRC, sub. no. 8: 2-3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>QRC position</th>
<th>QCA response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.1.5 Determination of disputes by the QCA</td>
<td>QRC was concerned that under the amended drafting, if a party to a dispute (i.e. Aurizon Network or any number of access seekers that could be involved in a dispute) chose not to agree to be bound by the determination of the dispute, the QCA would not be able to commence the determination. As such, one party could delay or prevent the dispute being considered. QRC proposed alternative drafting, which it indicated had been agreed with Aurizon Network.</td>
<td>QRC’s proposed drafting change provides clarification to ensure that Aurizon Network or any other party (such as an access seeker) cannot prevent dispute resolution proceedings by not agreeing to be bound by the outcome of the dispute. We agree with the suggested change. We note Aurizon Network and QRC have agreed to resolve the issue by means of a DAAU, if the Amended 2014 DAU is approved. We do not consider that the absence of this amendment provides a sufficient basis for us to refuse to approve the Amended 2014 DAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule E, 4.1</td>
<td>QRC proposed clarified drafting to ensure that this clause does not affect Aurizon Network’s obligations under clause 2.1(f) of Schedule E are not affected (i.e. Aurizon Network remains obligated to seek approval of capital expenditure following acceptance of a voting proposal). QRC indicated this drafting was agreed with Aurizon Network.</td>
<td>We agree this amendment is appropriate. We note, Aurizon Network and QRC have agreed to resolve the issue by means of a DAAU, if the Amended 2014 DAU is approved. We do not consider that the absence of this amendment provides a sufficient basis for us to refuse to approve the Amended 2014 DAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of consequential loss. SAA</td>
<td>The QRC said that there did not appear to be sufficient justification to amend the definition, and considered this amendment serves to make the definition more ambiguous.</td>
<td>It is noted the amended drafting is intended to ensure that the definition of consequential loss extends to third party claims that themselves fall within that definition. We consider this is appropriate and do not consider this to be inconsistent with the April 2016 Decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of certain warranties in Part 3 of the Access Interface Deed</td>
<td>While the QRC indicated it understood the purpose of the inclusion of these warranties, it raised concerns that it may not be possible for the customer to provide these warranties in all circumstances. The QRC proposed including a drafting note to clarify that Aurizon Network could accept warranties from a party which is able to give them, rather than only from the customer. It indicated Aurizon Network supported the inclusion of this note.</td>
<td>This approach is considered more flexible and is in our view appropriate. We note the QRC has indicated Aurizon Network’s agreement to clarify the intended operation of this clause through the insertion of a drafting note by means of a DAAU (if the Amended 2014 DAU is approved). Nonetheless, we do not consider that the absence of this amendment provides a sufficient basis for us to refuse to approve the Amended 2014 DAU.</td>
</tr>
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23 QRC, sub. no. 8: 3.  
24 QRC, sub. no. 8: 3-4.  
25 QRC, sub. no. 8: 4.  
26 QRC, sub. no. 8: 4-5.
3.2 Asciano submission

Asciano\(^{27}\) considered that while some of the amendments facilitate improved clarity and workability, other changes introduce new or amended concepts (e.g. changing definitions or inserting or deleting clauses and sub-clauses), which it considered are best considered as part of UT5.\(^{28}\) Asciano made a number of specific comments about changes made in the Amended 2014 DAU.

We have addressed the specific comments raised by Asciano in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Asciano comments and QCA response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clause</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.13 (c)</td>
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<td>3.13 (h)</td>
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<td>6.4.1 (d)(ii)</td>
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\(^{27}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2.

\(^{28}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2: 5.

\(^{29}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2: 6.

\(^{30}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2: 6.

\(^{31}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2: 6.
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<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.4.8 (b)</td>
<td>Asciano’s concern is that the term ‘Cost Allocation Proposal’ is not referred to in clause 6.4.3. The only place the term Cost Allocation Proposal appears in the 2014 DAU is in clause 6.4.8(b). On this basis, Asciano questioned whether this clause 6.4.8 (b) is referring to the wrong cross-reference.</td>
<td>We agree with Asciano that there is a drafting inconsistency in clause 6.4.8(b) of the 2014 Amended DAU. We consider that the clause should be amended to refer to clause 6.4.4. Nonetheless, we consider this to be a minor and inconsequential amendment that does not preclude us from approving the Amended 2014 DAU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.2.1 (a)(vi)</td>
<td>Asciano is concerned that this new clause inserted by Aurizon Network is subjective. Asciano said that it recognised that this clause is intended to address instances where a party seeks to sit in the queue rather than execute an access agreement, however Asciano believes that clause 7.2.2 (c) already provides Aurizon Network with an ability to review an access seeker’s position in a queue every six months and therefore the insertion of clause 7.2.1 (a)(vi) is unnecessary.</td>
<td>We consider that the amendment made by Aurizon Network assists in clarifying the management of the queue, and better informs Aurizon Network at the six-monthly review. We do not consider that it is subjective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.2 (b)(i)(C)</td>
<td>Asciano said it believes that drafting changes in this clause relating to submitting transfers within a certain timeframe prior to the next train ordering week will reduce the number of short term transfers that could otherwise occur.</td>
<td>We acknowledge Asciano’s comment but the change was made to be consistent with operational processes. We accept Aurizon Network’s view that the proposed change is more workable. We agree that there is potential for transfers to be discouraged. However, the register of transfers required under clause 10.5.2 should provide the necessary information to further consider the operation of short-term transfers in UT5. We consider that the amendment is appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.2 (e)(iii)(E)</td>
<td>Asciano seeks clarification as to whether this original clause refers to above rail haulage agreements or below rail access agreements. If the intention is to refer to above rail haulage agreements (which the original clause seems to imply) than the removal of this clause may have impacts on above rail haulage</td>
<td>We confirm that the original clause refers to above rail haulage agreements. We have confirmed with Aurizon Network that as there are no rail haulage agreements that satisfy the exception the deleted clause addressed, deletion of this clause does not affect any existing rail haulage agreements.</td>
</tr>
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32 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 6.  
33 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 6-7.  
34 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 7.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>7.4.2 (h)</td>
<td>Asciano said it believed all transfers (regardless of type) should be addressed in section 7.4.2. Asciano said that the QCA should assess whether such transfers are better managed under the access application in Part 4. If the QCA assess that these transfers are better managed under Part 4 than the transfer process in 7.4.2 should at least state that the access application process under Part 4 is to be applied for transfers that require additional access rights and detailed assessment. Otherwise, a transfer of this type is not covered in the transfer process under clause 7.4.2.</td>
<td>Clause 7.4.2(d) clearly states that Part 4 will apply where clause 7.4.2(f) or (g) does not apply. Accordingly, we considered deletion of clause 7.4.2(h) to be reasonable in reducing process in the undertaking and improving workability. We consider this clause is appropriate. However, we propose to further review and streamline the transfers arrangements to the extent possible as better information becomes available in future undertakings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.3 (b)</td>
<td>Asciano is concerned that the 20 day timeframe between the period when an access seeker intends to take up the offer of access rights and for them to execute an access agreement is too short in practical terms. For example, the internal governance process for an access seeker may take longer than 20 days. Asciano is also concerned that if an access seeker cannot meet this 20 day period their opportunity to gain access rights lapses and clause 7.5.3 (c) applies where negotiations are suspended as per clause 4.8. The suspension process under clause 4.8 does not give any indication of what position in a queue the suspended access application retains under such a scenario.</td>
<td>We agree with this amendment because it promotes the efficient use of capacity where there is a queue. We consider the queue should not be held up for lengthy periods. 20 business days should be sufficient for internal processes, given that participants are in a queue and should be able to plan ahead to some extent. We therefore consider the clause to be appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Expansion</td>
<td>If the projects being undertaking for safety and operational performance reasons are being undertaken as the direct result of an expansion then these projects should be considered as an expansion project.</td>
<td>We consider that safety and operational projects that result from an expansion should be considered as part of the expansion. Hence such an expansion would not have as a primary objective safety and operational performance. We therefore consider the clause to be appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule E 1.1(e)</td>
<td>Asciano said its concern is that if assets which have been replaced by newer works remain in the asset base then</td>
<td>We consider this change consistent with the policy position of our April 2016 Decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 7.
36 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 7.
37 Asciano, sub. no. 2: 8.
38 Asciano, sub.no. 2: 8.
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<tbody>
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<td>39</td>
<td>this may artificially inflate the value of the asset base. If an asset has been replaced its value should be removed from the asset base.[^39]</td>
<td>The issue may warrant further consideration as part of UT5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule E 1.2(c)(iii)</td>
<td>Asciano said its concern is that this new clause constrains the QCA. Asciano believes that all parties recognise that the RAB will only be reduced if no other reasonable options are available. Asciano said it believes that this matter is better considered as part of UT5.[^40]</td>
<td>We consider that the amendment does not constrain the QCA given that all reasonable options would be considered. The approach remains consistent with the policy position of our April 2016 Decision. However, we agree that it may warrant ongoing consideration in UT5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule G 2(d) and (e)</td>
<td>Asciano said its concern is that the Capacity Assessment Report as contemplated by clause 7A.4.2(h) does not yet exist. Until the Capacity Assessment Report exists then the wording in Schedule G, clause 2(d) and (e) of the Amended 2014 DAU should be retained. Following the development of the Capacity Assessment Report this matter should be reviewed. Asciano believes that this matter is better considered as part of UT5. Furthermore, Asciano notes that clause 7A.4.2(h) requires Aurizon Network to publish the Strategic Train Plan on its website for each coal system to the QCA and stakeholders, whereas the intent of the obligations under clauses 2(d) and (e) of Schedule G is to provide the Strategic Train Plan to individual access holders and access seekers. Asciano suggests that the amended clause 2(c) of Schedule G should also make references to the obligations under clause 7A.4.2(g) to ensure that access holders, access seekers, customers and train operators are recipients of the Strategic Train Plan.[^41]</td>
<td>We note the issues raised by Asciano and agree they could be reviewed as part of UT5. The amendments need to be tested for workability, but for UT4, we consider the amendments appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule G 2 (j) and (k)</td>
<td>Asciano said its concern is that the Capacity Assessment Report as contemplated by 7A.4.2(h) does not yet exist. Until the Capacity Assessment Report exists then the wording in Schedule G, clause 2 (j) and (k) should be retained. Following the development of the Capacity Assessment Report this matter should be reviewed. Asciano believes</td>
<td>We note the issues raised by Asciano and agree they could be reviewed as part of UT5. The amendments need to be tested for workability, but for UT4, we consider the amendments appropriate.</td>
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[^40] Asciano, sub. no. 2: 8.  
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<tr>
<td>that this matter is better considered as part of UT5.&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aurizon Network subsequently indicated that the Master Train Plan would include TSEs as proposed by Asciano. However, whether this information can be made public is a matter for the parties concerned. We consider this clause is appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule G 3.1 (d), (f) and (g)</td>
<td>Asciano said it is concerned that this changed wording would only obligate Aurizon Network to include in the Master Train Plan those train service entitlements (TSEs) contained in agreements entered into after the approval date of UT4. Asciano is seeking confirmation that the Master Train Plan will include all TSEs. Asciano also notes that Schedule G clause 3.1 (b) specifies that the Master Train Plan must be published covering a period of at least one month and up to three months. On this basis, Asciano believes that the time period obligations under Schedule G clause 3.1 (b) may limit Aurizon Network exposure as they only publishing an access holder’s future contracted paths for a maximum of three months. The QCA should consider whether the amendments to clause 3.1 (f)(A) and (B) are necessary on this basis.&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule G 8.3 (a)(i)</td>
<td>Asciano said that in order to ensure all transfers are considered in this process the amended clause should refer to all transfers, not just short term transfers.&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>We consider that the drafting is not limiting, that is, it is including short-term transfers. We consider that this clause is appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard access agreement / standard rail</td>
<td>Asciano expressed concern at amendments being made to this definition at this stage and said this</td>
<td>It is noted the amendment is intended to ensure that the definition of consequential loss extends to third party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clause 6.2(a)</td>
<td>Asciano noted the different timeframes in clause 6.2(a) and considered the access holder should be provided with 10 business days to provide security under this clause.&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>This clause provides for security to be provided by an access holder within 10 business days after being required to do so by Aurizon Network. We note the shorter timeframe in this clause relates to one of the circumstances in which Aurizon Network may require security (i.e. failure to pay amount payable under the agreement where there is no due date for payment), not the timeframe in which security must be provided. We note Aurizon Network’s amendment clarifies the operation of this clause and does not change the relevant timeframes from the April 2016 Decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>42</sup> Asciano, sub. no. 2: 9.
<sup>43</sup> Asciano, sub. no. 2: 9.
<sup>44</sup> Asciano, sub. no. 2: 9.
<sup>45</sup> Asciano, sub. no. 2: 10.
### Clause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Asciano position</th>
<th>QCA response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>connection agreement / standard studies funding agreement Definition of Consequential loss</td>
<td>matter is better considered as part of UT5.</td>
<td>claims that themselves fall within that definition. We consider this is appropriate and do not consider this to be inconsistent with the April 2016 Decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Aurizon Operations submission

Aurizon Operations\(^{47}\) recommended that the QCA accept the amended 2014 DAU to bring the UT4 regulatory process to a close. However, Aurizon Operations raised a concern about the treatment of relinquishment fees for a reduction in train paths resulting from an increase in train payloads - noting that there was a different approach used by the QCA in the Aurizon Network and Queensland Rail decisions. It sought the issue to be on the public record to be addressed as part of UT5.\(^{48}\)

**QCA’s response**

We accept that there is a difference between the treatment of relinquishment fees. The QCA’s decisions rest on applying the section 138(2) factors to specific factual circumstances for each declared service, and this could be expected to result in different outcomes. However, we note it is open for this issue to be further considered as part of UT5, as proposed by Aurizon Operations. In light of the above, we consider that Aurizon Operations' submission does not raise sufficiently material concerns regarding the appropriateness of the Amended 2014 DAU to preclude us from approving the Amended 2014 DAU.

### 3.4 BMA submission

BMA\(^{49}\) supported the Amended 2014 DAU as submitted by Aurizon Network, but reserved the right to reconsider specific aspects in the future. BMA agreed with QRC’s concerns, but to avoid delays, agreed the matters can be revisited as part of UT5.

**QCA’s response**

In light of the above, we consider that BMA’s submission does not raise sufficiently material concerns regarding the appropriateness of the Amended 2014 DAU to preclude us from approving the Amended 2014 DAU. We note it is open for BMA to raise issues for further consideration as part of UT5.

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\(^{46}\) Asciano, sub. no. 2: 10-11.

\(^{47}\) Aurizon Operations, sub. no. 3.

\(^{48}\) Aurizon Operations, sub. no. 3: 1-2.

\(^{49}\) BMA, sub. no. 4.
REFERENCES

QCA (2012), Final Decision, Wiggins Island Rail Project Stage 1 - Rail Infrastructure Access Conditions, May.
QCA (2010), Final Decision, QR Network’s DAU, September.
SUBMISSIONS

Aurizon Network’s submissions
  - July 2016, Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking Cover letter and explanatory notes (sub. no. 1)

Stakeholders’ submissions
Asciano
  - July 2016, Submission on the Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking (sub. no. 2)

Aurizon Operations
  - July 2016, Submission on the Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking (sub. no. 3)

BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance (BMA)
  - July 2016, Submission on the Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking (sub. no. 4)

Glencore Xstrata (Glencore)
  - July 2016, Submission on the Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking (sub. no. 5)
  - July 2016, Castalia, Required Adjustment to the Access Undertaking in the Context of the Wiggins Island Rail Project Deed (sub. no. 6)
  - July 2016, Allens, QCA Powers in response to WIRP Access Conditions (sub. no. 7)

Queensland Resources Council (QRC)
  - July 2016, Submission on the Amended 2014 Draft Access Undertaking (sub. no. 8)